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Abstract. The fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, resulted from a 
complex pattern of causes, including historical contingencies. One of these was 
Günter Schabowski’s ill-phrased announcement of free travel for GDR citizens, 
another Mikhail Gorbachev’s access to power in 1985 and his promise of 
“perestroika”. At the core of the matter lies “the German question” as the key 
issue of controversies, in the early phase of the Cold War. Even after 1955, when 
the two post-war German states had been integrated into the military blocs, the 
German question remained on the diplomatic agenda. The erection of the Berlin 
Wall in 1961, however, signified that the “German problem” had been shelved. 
After the Cuban crisis in October 1962, when the two superpowers refrained 
from nuclear confrontation, they appeared to enter into an era of détente. 
Facing up to these facts, West Berlin´s Mayor Willy Brandt and, foremost, his 
adviser Egon Bahr developed their concept of “Ostpolitik”. Its long-term 
perspective was to change the status quo of German division by accepting the status 
quo, i.e. the consequences of WW II, the Oder-Neisse border to Poland, the reality 
of the blocs, and the East German state under Communist rule. It was based on 
the assumption a) that détente was an irreversible process and b) that the GDR, 
displaying economic stability at that time, while remaining an indispensable 
element in the Soviet bloc, would be disposed to forms of cooperation. 
The dialectics of history proved otherwise. Geopolitical rivalries between the 
superpowers continued to exist. In 1979, the Soviet Union’s military intervention 
in Afghanistan coincided with its opening another round in the arms race 
focussing on intermediate-range missiles in Central Europe. Both decisions 
propitiated the interior crisis of the Soviet Union, due to technological 
backwardness and military overburdening of its state-run economy. Gorbachev’s 
attempts at reform proved ineffective, his proclamation of glasnost encouraged 
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dissident movements in Eastern Central Europe, e.g. the independent peace 
movement in the GDR, to resist their regimes. Gorbachev’s renunciation of the 
“Brezhnev doctrine” motivated reform-minded governments in Poland and 
Hungary to test the limits of Soviet hegemony. 
The decisive factor was the comprehensive crisis in the GDR: an 
unproductive economy based on external debts, a decrepit infrastructure, 
ecological damage, an oppressive dictatorship rejecting reform, dissident activists 
challenging the regime. All this, in the autumn of 1989, led to the mass exodus of 
East Germans fleeing across Hungary’s open border to Austria. The upshot of 
this course of events was the collapse of the Berlin Wall. 
Germany’s reunification in 1990 entailed the creation of the European Union, 
an in-between of a confederation and a federal union of states. Its raison d´être is 
to a) provide a structure of peace in Europe b) to avert German hegemony on the 
Continent based on its power potential. Nonetheless, apprehensions concerning 
Germany’s future role in Europe have not altogether vanished. With regard to its 
immigration policy, some observers speak of a new type of “moral hegemony”. 
Last but not least, Merkel´s decision in 2015 admitting millions of migrants to 
Europe, tipped the scale in favour of Brexit. 
 
Keywords: “the German question”, “Ostpolitik”, crisis of the Soviet Empire, 
perestroika, the future of Europe 
 
 
I. 
November 9, 1989, the day the Berlin Wall came down, will remain 
one of the great historical markers of the 20th century, completely 
altering the political landscape of Europe that had emerged from 
World War II and profoundly affecting Europe’s fate in the present. 
Looking back on the events of 1989/1990 thirty years after the 
collapse of the Wall, we are taking for granted what back then to 
many observers of world politics had seemed inconceivable: a 
reunited Germany in the centre of a united Europe. 
It may be noted that for all the public commemoration of this 
annus mirabilis, the tones of joy and jubilation in Germany are 
somewhat subdued. This may be in part due to the intellectual 
climate in a country that continues to fail in coming to terms with 
its painful historical burden. In fact, the ambivalence of 
predominantly West German intellectuals as to the history and 
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culture of their country accounts for the rejection of emotions 
suspected of “nationalism”. They will point out that the joyful date 
of November 9, 1989 coincides with the sinister date of November 
9, 1938 in Nazi Germany. They may recall that a few days after the 
Wall came down, the demands for German reunification first 
emerged in “the East” during the demonstrations in Plauen, Leipzig, 
Dresden and elsewhere. Emotions were carried by flag-waving, by 
the slogan „Deutschland einig Vaterland” (Germany united fatherland 
– the line taken from the original GDR anthem) and by the phrase 
„Wir sind ein Volk” (We are one people). Recollections of this sort do 
not fit into the image and reality of a multi-ethnic society that 
Germany – like other West European countries – is in the process 
of becoming. These profound changes are taking place in parallel 
with the academic tendencies to “deconstruct” the concept 
(devalued as an “invention” or “narrative”) of nation as the historical 
basis and political framework of democratic self-determination. 
To be sure, the media are calling back to memory the dramatic 
course of events in the late summer and autumn of 1989, leading up 
to the climax at that November night 1989. Post-wall generations 
thus can get an idea of what happened back then: in the beginning, 
there was the press conference where Günter Schabowski (deceased 
in 2015, his name forgotten), member of the SED Politbureau (an 
unfamiliar term to many today), responded to an Italian journalist´s 
question concerning free travel for GDR citizens in dubious 
grammar. The announcement on West Berlin radio and TV set a 
number of East Berliners to probing the promise. When TV 
anchorman Hanns Joachim Friedrich (1927-1995) in his 
introduction to the late evening news injected the interpretative 
phrase “...the gates in the Wall are wide open” (...die Tore in der Mauer 
stehen weit offen), he triggered the rush of thousands of East Berliners 
to the checkpoints. At Bornholmer Strasse, the border guard (i.e. 
Stasi / Staatssicherheit / “state security”) officer Harald Jäger in 
view of the pressing mass of people decided to raise the barrier, just 
half an hour before midnight. The next morning the world was 
watching crowds dancing on the crescent-shaped wall barring the 
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Brandenburg Gate. Banners displayed the people’s political wit, 
German flags hitherto primarily seen at sports events signalled their 
political will, young men smashing through the Wall with sledge-
hammers. 
That the Wall came down without a shot being fired, that 
Germany’s reunification into a single state was achieved in peaceful 
agreement, they both make the events of 1989/1990 appear as 
historically exceptional, if not miraculous. We can ignore here the 
dispute promoted by some GDR veterans like Egon Krenz, Erich 
Honecker´s successor as the head of the party and state, by 
sympathizers of the party “Die Linke” and others insisting on the 
term “turn“ (“die Wende“) in order to downsize the term 
“revolution“. In most features, the end of the GDR amounts to a 
revolution except for its nonviolent dialectics and its peaceful 
outcome. None of this was foreseeable, as we recall the ominous 
atmosphere during the mass demonstration of some 70 000 people 
in the dark streets of Leipzig on October 9, 1989. All things 
considered, the revolution in the GDR displays the historical pattern 
of remote and immediate causes, of deep-rooted and growing 
unrest, of an activist minority challenging the authorities, of power-
wielders at odds with the situation, last but not least of 
contingencies. Among these, we may count the historical 
circumstances attached to the name of Mikhail Gorbachev. 
 
 
II.  
Recently, a dispute has arisen between the historian Ilko-Sascha 
Kowalczuk, a former GDR oppositionist, and the sociologist Detlef 
Pollack, a former non-activist student of theology at Leipzig. 
Kowalczuk argues that the dissident minority who ventured to set 
forth from the precincts of Leipzig´s Nikolaikirche and to enter the 
streets on September 4 with their banners deserve all the credit for 
triggering the mass protests in the weeks to come. He also sides with 
those who extol the role of Poland´s Solidarnośź in challenging the 
Communist regime there back in 1981 and in paving the way for the 
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breakdown of the Soviet empire. By proposing the term “exit 
revolution”, his opponent Pollack insists on the decisive role of the 
long-time non-activist majority whose discontent erupted in the late 
summer and autumn of 1989, with masses of “ordinary” people 
fleeing from the GDR via Hungary and the West German embassies 
in Prague and Warsaw. In this view, the exodus of young men, 
women, and children leaving the GDR in rage and despair 
delegitimized the regime more visibly than the protesters, who 
gained their cutting-edge strength only when tens of thousands 
dared to join them in the streets. 
Controversies of this sort may sharpen the view for the dramatic 
phase preceding the fall of the Wall in 1989, although they tend to 
curtail the full scope of the drama. To get to the core of events in 
1989, a wider perspective is needed. It will encompass East-West 
relations after the Berlin Wall was raised, in August 1961, and after 
the Cuban crisis, in October 1962. In the post-war era until the late 
1950s, the division of Germany was considered a key issue of the 
Cold War. The indicative date is the Geneva conference in 1959 
when, for the last time, the Four Powers – admitting two separate 
delegations from the FRG and the GDR as “observers” - convened 
on the German question. Two years later, the Wall dividing Berlin 
and the refugees shot at the Wall signified to the world that the 
German question had been shelved. In fact, for quite a few members 
of the political elites in Western Europe, the division of Germany 
had its charm; for others, it preserved its features of a frozen 
conflict. On a theoretical – and practical - level, the two German 
states´ integration into the bloc structure under the hegemony of the 
USA respectively the Soviet Union served to maintain the balance 
of power in Europe. From the perspective of a country with strong 
national traditions like Poland, the arrangement came to be known 
as the “system of Yalta”.  
Confronted with the reality of the Wall, German hopes for 
“reunification” began to fade. In fact, patriotic sentiments among 
the younger generation in West Germany tended to rapidly weaken 
in the wake of the student revolt associated with the date “1968”. 
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The student movement’s radicalism was triggered June 2, 1967, 
when a student participating in a demonstration against the 
autocratic Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi of Iran, who was visiting 
West Berlin, was shot by a police officer. (Some forty years later, in 
2009, Stasi files revealed that the killer had originally been a GDR 
Stasi agent.) The students’ furore exploded in the Easter days of 
1968 after a right-wing extremist’s attempt to kill West Berlin’s 
charismatic student leader Rudi Dutschke (1940-1979), a refugee 
from the East. Focussing on the war in Vietnam, the emotions of 
West German intellectuals (like elsewhere in Western Europe) were 
swayed by anti-imperialism meaning identification with revolutions 
in the Third World, by radical socialism and individual 
emancipation. In Dutschke´s speeches and writings – by no means 
based on sober analysis - revolutionary fervour directed against both 
US capitalism and Soviet oppression were merged with national 
aspirations. After recovering from cerebral injuries inflicted by the 
attempt on his life, he and some of his friends resumed contacts 
with dissidents in Eastern Europe. Thus, in the seventies, Dutschke 
came out as a standard-bearer of attacks on the division of Germany 
and Europe. A few months before his death on Christmas Eve 1979, 
he was one of the co-founders of the West German Greens who, at 
that time, put forth the German question in their (then) pacifist, 
ecological, and feminist platform. 
Radical opposition to the status quo in Europe implied a critical 
approach to the piecemeal strategies pursued by the Social 
Democrats in the 1970s. In view of political realities embodied by 
the Wall, the concept had been worked out in West Berlin by Mayor 
Willy Brandt’s adviser and friend Egon Bahr (1922-2015), often 
referred to as the “architect of Ostpolitik”. It was based on several 
assumptions. First, faced with the possibility of mutual destruction, 
the two nuclear superpowers had entered into an era of détente, 
both sides respecting the existing bloc structure. This meant that 
Germany’s partition was to persist for a prolonged period of time. 
To keep the idea of one German nation alive in the generation to 
come, it was essential to maintain and strengthen ties of family, 
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friendship and culture. Second, from his German point of interest, 
Bahr saw political chances in the approach promoted by President 
Kennedy that the acceptance of the status quo was the prerequisite 
for overcoming the status quo. Third, in the course of 
rapprochement, a comprehensive security system was to replace the 
military blocs. In this process, the two German states would develop 
a mutual interest in the reunification of the country. In some 
aspects, this concept fit in with the theory promulgated at that time 
in the United States that there was a long-term tendency of 
convergence of the opposing systems of Western capitalism and 
Eastern communism arising from the necessities and nonideological 
mechanisms of industrial societies. 
Bahr first promoted his concept under the title of “Wandel durch 
Annäherung” (change by approach). While this idea was rejected by 
East German politicians and ideologues as another scheme of 
subversion, the Soviets and their allies were ready to respond to the 
initiatives taken by Federal Chancellor Brandt right after entering 
the office, in 1969. For the Soviets (and of course for the Poles), the 
German acceptance of the status quo, i.e. the recognition of the post-
war territorial order (above all the Oder-Neisse border with Poland) 
held some promise. They were prepared, then, to accept certain 
elements of “Ostpolitik”. The next three years (1970-1973), a series 
of treaties were concluded. The Moscow leadership under Leonid 
Brezhnev pressured the East Germans – by replacing the reluctant 
Walter Ulbricht as head of the party and the state by Erich Honecker 
- into negotiating with their West German counterparts. These 
negotiations resulted in a treaty establishing the “fundamental basis 
of relations” between the two states. The Soviets themselves signed 
a “Four-Power-Agreement” with their former allies that served to 
improve the situation in West Berlin in 1971. The document 
contained a formula stating that the four powers’ ultimate sovereign 
rights in Germany were unaffected by the agreement. It made clear, 
that – in the absence of a peace treaty - the victors of World War II 
still had a say in German affairs. 
“Ostpolitik” was based on a long-time perspective. Its merits are 
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out of a dispute. With Chancellor Willy Brandt as its anti-Nazi 
protagonist, it served to expel the spectre of German revanchism 
from the East European scenery, thus preparing the acceptance of 
a united Germany in the future. As to its short-term goals, it 
succeeded in maintaining and promoting contacts between 
Germans on either side of the dividing border. To be sure, visits 
from the other side still turned out to be a rather bothering affair, 
due to red tape, to a system of controls at the border marked by an 
ugly fence and surmounted by watchtowers, or German Shephard 
search dogs led by guards on the trains. Whereas for an increasing 
number of younger West Germans, the GDR comprising core 
territories of German history and culture thus came to be a remote 
terra incognita, a reverse self-perception prevailed in the East. The 
theory proclaimed by ideologues that there existed two separate 
German nations never really caught on in the GDR. By meeting 
with relatives and friends from the West, by listening to older family 
members with travel permits reporting their impressions in the 
West, last but not least by watching West German TV, people in the 
GDR, while widely accepting their state as a given fact, preserved 
the idea of belonging to the same nation as their cousins and 
nephews in the West. Also, personal contacts, Western radio and 
TV as well as travelling in the more liberal East European states like 
Poland and Hungary nourished doubts, discontent, and hopes for a 
different future. 
The concept of promoting an irrevocable process of détente, 
arms control, and cooperation easing and replacing the conflict 
between the hegemonic powers and their bloc systems did not 
materialize to the degree expected by some of its proponents. In 
fact, the Soviet leadership showed little enthusiasm in weakening 
their position in Eastern Europe (as demonstrated once again in 
Prague, in 1968). On the other hand, the Soviets were interested in 
having the status quo accepted by the West in a conclusive form. The 
mutual agreement on the status quo was achieved at the Helsinki 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), in 
1975. However, the Final Act of CSCE in “Basket III” contained 
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one vital concession extracted from the eastern negotiators 
obligating the participants to the respect of civil rights. Although 
being open to interpretation, this formula proved helpful for East 
European dissidents as an argument in their protracted opposition 
to the repressive regimes in their countries. In East Germany, the 
authorities dealt with refractive dissidents by first jailing them for an 
indefinite period of time, then transferring them to the West – a 
mechanism based on informal accords with the Federal Republic. 
Some were granted exit visas they had applied for, others were 
expelled like protest singer poet Wolf Biermann, in 1976, followed 
by the oppositionist Robert Havemann’s friend Jürgen Fuchs (1950-
1999), in 1977, or peace activist Roland Jahn from Jena, in 1983. 
Others continued to take the risks of being shot or captured in 
escaping to the West. 
It is misleading, then, to consider “Basket III” as the original and 
most effective key in bringing down the Wall and the Soviet empire. 
Despite the Helsinki accords, the Cold War continued in Third 
World regions, in geopolitical rivalry (e.g. Soviet military bases in 
Syria and Libya), in alliances with dictatorial regimes in Africa and 
Asia, as well as in interferences in civil wars. The upshot came with 
the Soviets’ military intervention in Afghanistan on Christmas 1979. 
The Politbureau’s decision to rescue the tattering Communist 
regime in Kabul threatened by traditionalist tribal forces proved to 
be a fatal mistake. The mujaheddin (of various fundamentalist Islamic 
backgrounds) instigated and equipped with arms by the US under 
President Jimmy Carter and his security adviser Zbigniev Brzezinzki 
as well as aided by the Islamist regimes of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia 
put up ferocious resistance. The Soviets found themselves bogged 
down in a guerrilla war that only ended in Spring 1988 during 
Gorbachev’s perestroika. 
 
 
III.  
The dialectics of history turned against the Soviet regime when it 
entered into another round of the arms race with NATO. At the 
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core of the matter lays the idea of the military balance of power. 
Since the 1960s, the two superpowers – an appropriate term at that 
time – have concluded a number of treaties intended to reduce the 
dangers of the all-out nuclear war. Arms control was to comprise 
nuclear missile systems, limiting and balancing arsenals to thereby 
guarantee mutual security. In the late1970s, NATO analysts 
observed that the Soviet Union had been “modernizing” its 
intermediate-range missile system with devices named SS 20. From 
the Western perspective, the new Soviet missiles would have opened 
a “gap” in the pattern of security based on stages of nuclear 
deterrence. The dispute over missile deployment came to a head in 
1979, coinciding with the Soviets’ invasion in Afghanistan. The 
West responded with announcing the deployment of equivalent 
systems to be based primarily in West Germany.  
By unhinging the accepted military pattern of security, Soviet 
political strategists may also have intended to loosen the ties 
between Western allies, above all by shaking West Germany’s 
reliance on the US nuclear security shield. Whatever these 
intentions, the idea backfired in the wake of a massive peace 
movement in West Germany in the early 1980s. Inspired in part by 
genuine pacifism, in part by leftist partisan activism, in part by 
national sentiments (“No additional nuclear weapons on German 
soil!”) the movement saw an unexpected recurrence of the “German 
question”. For a short period of time, the Greens emerging as a new 
force made up of diverse splinter groups of the student movement 
allying themselves – thanks to Rudi Dutschke’s efforts prior to his 
death - with national-neutralist elements, seemed to be its most 
vociferous standard-bearers. The “national-patriotic” wing of the 
Greens, however, was soon to be pushed aside by experienced 
politicos like Joschka Fischer, later on, Foreign Minister of the 
reunited country. 
Political excitement grew when, in parallel to a mass 
demonstration in Bonn against the new weapons, an “Open Letter” 
inspired, in parts, by friends of mine in West Berlin and authorized 
by the prominent dissident Robert Havemann (1910-1982) was 
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publicized in October 1981. Bearing the names of signatories from 
both East and West, it was addressed to the Soviet leader Brezhnev 
on the eve of his state visit to Bonn. The text demanded the 
conclusion of peace treaties instead of relying on infertile schemes 
of nuclear military balance. It called for the withdrawal of foreign 
troops from Germany. To add to the excitement in the media and 
among the political class, the “Open Letter” ended with the phrase 
“it should be left to us, to the Germans ourselves, how to solve the 
national question”. The “Havemann Letter” posited a clear 
challenge to the status quo. Its political significance lays in attracting 
attention to an outspoken group of dissidents in the GDR rejecting 
the regime’s claim to peace and political sovereignty. At the date of 
Havemann’s death, in April 1982, another “Appeal from Berlin” 
(even though receiving less resonance) was voiced by his pastor 
friend Rainer Eppelmann. The dissidents asserted to represent the 
“independent peace movement” in the East. A number of them held 
contacts with the opposition in the neighbouring countries, often 
dating back to their hopes and frustration during the “Prague 
Spring”, in 1968. The opposition’s basis became visible in many 
Protestant churches, young people wearing badges displaying the 
Biblical promise of “swords into ploughshares” (Schwerter zu 
Pflugscharen) and protesting against militarist education in schools.  
At the state level of politics, East-West contacts followed the 
pattern of uneasy relations between the superpowers and their 
clients. When Chancellor Helmut Schmidt came to meet Erich 
Honecker in December 1981, the visit, whilst displaying the regime’s 
repressive character, produced no positive results. At the very same 
time, Prime Minister General Wojciech Jaruzelski proclaimed 
martial law in Poland to preclude the dangers of Soviet (and possibly 
East German) intervention against Solidarnośź and its tendency to 
break away from the bloc. 
Emotions calmed down after Helmut Kohl (CDU) succeeded 
Helmut Schmidt (SPD) as chancellor in 1982, due to the Liberals’ 
(FDP) switch of coalition from the Social Democrats to the 
Christian Democrats. The peace movement, powerful for a short 
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moment, subsided when the “missile crisis” was over, NATO 
stationing US missiles in autumn 1983 without causing hostile 
Soviet reaction. Chancellor Kohl continued the pragmatic approach 
in dealing with the GDR. A spectacular deal with the GDR came 
into the open in Summer 1983, when the Bavarian Prime Minister 
Franz Josef Strauß cooperated with a dubious East German 
negotiator (a Stasi officer residing in a posh Bavarian resort) to grant 
a credit of a billion DM to the GDR. The money served to prevent 
the collapse of the GDR’s badly indebted, technically outdated and 
unproductive economy. A year later, Strauß even steered his private 
plane to Leipzig to convey another credit. The positive idea behind 
these deals was to prevent an uprising in the GDR, which might 
have provoked the Soviets to suppress it with their tanks. Thus, on 
the governmental level, relations between the two states did not 
deteriorate. In September 1987, Helmut Kohl even invited Erich 
Honecker to a formal visit in Bonn, making it clear that he was 
maintaining the goal of German unity. Honecker did not openly 
object, yet insisted on the prevalence of peace. He also used the 
opportunity to see his sister in his mining home town in the 
Saarland. 
Meanwhile, the Social Democrats in parliamentary opposition 
pursued a policy of their own. Protagonists of “Ostpolitik” believed 
that negotiating with SED functionaries on issues of peace and 
ideological “disarmament” could serve to improve relations 
between the two German states. In their written proclamations, the 
concept of transforming the status quo was abandoned in favour of 
speaking of the historically durable existence of the two states. Some 
upheld the idea of Germany’s division as a prerequisite to peace in 
Europe, assisted by Protestant pastors who, ignoring historical facts, 
mystified the country’s partition as resulting from historical guilt. 
Even Egon Bahr, the architect of “Ostpolitik”, seemed to have 
rescinded his long-time goal of restoring Germany’s unity. In 
echoing pronouncements from the East, he repeatedly affirmed the 
existence of two separate German states as a stabilizing element in 
the bloc structure. In oppositional circles demanding civil rights and 
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political change in Eastern Central Europe, Bahr was to become the 
bête noire, viewed as the protagonist of immobility and the status quo. 
His negative popularity among dissidents was not helped by his well-
known back-channel contacts with the Soviet diplomat Valentin 
Falin. Even for some weeks after the Wall came down, Bahr warned 
against demands for reunification. It is to his credit as a political 
strategist, though, that in 1988, when no one expected the Berlin 
Wall to collapse like the walls of Jericho, he presented a design of 
transcending the status quo. In a small book titled “Zum 
europäischen Frieden. Eine Antwort auf Gorbatschow” (Concerning 
European Peace. An Answer to Gorbachev), he had called for peace 
treaties to restore full sovereignty to the two German states. Though 
not expressed explicitly, the intention was to open the road for some 
form of reunification. 
Meanwhile, in West German schools, teachers in politics classes 
focussed on “comparison of systems”, overlooking the totalitarian 
features of a rigid dictatorship and elevating the GDR to a 
productive industrial country ranking tenth among the world’s 
economies. Economic experts tended to overlook the obvious 
deficiencies of the state-run economy. These were exacerbated 
when, in the early 1980’s, the Soviet Union, itself in economic 
troubles, reduced petrol exports to its “fraternal states” while raising 
the price to world market level. Without credits from the West to 
service its debts, then, the GDR would have faced bankruptcy years 
before. Its real economic status was revealed after Honecker’s 
deposition in October 1989 in the compte rendu presented by 
Politbureau member Gerhard Schürer, head of the State Planning 
Commission. 
Notwithstanding evident facts, as late as 1986, the influential 
liberal weekly “Die Zeit” presented an optimistic view of the East 
German scenery, ignoring the decay of the economy, its decrepit 
infrastructure, its outdated machinery, the severe ecological 
damages caused by sulphurous emissions from soft coal power 
plants, last but not least, the sad appearance of dilapidated inner 
cities. The GDR, proclaimed editor-in-chief Theo Sommer in a 
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comprehensive misperception of reality, was to be recognized as a 
modern, economically efficient state directed by well-trained 
technocrats in industry and agriculture. To cling to the idea of 
German reunification was considered a political nuisance as well as 
an absurdity. Like a good politician as many other West German 
ones, Oskar Lafontaine (SPD), reneged the idea of German unity. 
Cultivating a special relationship with his Saar compatriot Erich 
Honecker, he demanded to cancel the concept of citizenship in the 
Federal Republic hitherto based on German nationality. A 
constitutional change depriving East Germans of being entitled to 
citizenship in the Federal Republic of Germany would have changed 
their status of refugees from the East to that of asylum-seekers. 
To be sure, there were quite a few journalists conscientiously 
reporting on the true state of East German affairs. They were 
observing the erosion of the regime from below. Peace and “green” 
activities in the churches - like pastor Eppelmann’s blues masses at 
Gethsemane Church in East Berlin - attracted young people who, 
more often, had not been raised in atheist families. “Scientific 
socialism” revealed in the doctrines of Marxism-Leninism had long 
lost its intellectual charm except for true believers. The every-day 
aspects of “real socialism” (Realsozialismus) contradicted the utopian 
promise upheld by the ideologues. Imports of popular culture like 
rock und punk music served to evoke emotions against the regime’s 
oppressiveness personified in the omnipresent Stasi and its octopus-
like system of informers. When August 16, 1988, the British band 
Pink Floyd gave a concert near the Reichstag, sending their song 
“The Wall” via megawatt sound boxes across the Wall, thousands 
of people flocked to listen on the eastern side. The police feared a 
revolutionary outbreak when the crowds commenced shouting 
“The Wall must go down” (“Die Mauer muss weg!”). By 1989, the 
atmosphere in East German cities was charged with open rebellion. 
All this went unnoticed by many contemporaries in the West. In 
the Federal Republic, delusion mixed with “Western” indifference 
to matters East continued to prevail among a great many – not 
among all - West German intellectuals, in contrast to ordinary 
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people who kept visiting the East. In the GDR, there were a number 
of dissidents like Edelbert Richter, teaching philosophy at church 
seminars in Naumburg and Erfurt, and his student Christian 
Dietrich, who voiced clear-cut opposition to the “German-
German” status quo. East German activists were encouraged by 
friends like Jiři Dienstbier who, later on, after the “velvet 
revolution” in Prague ensuing the fall of the Wall, became Foreign 
Minister of Czechoslovakia, to speak out on the “German 
question”. The division of Germany was guaranteeing Soviet 
hegemony and Communist rule in Eastern Europe. In the West, 
though, reflecting on the “German question” was considered as a 
futile exercise in nostalgia left to sentimentalists, the author of this 
text being one of them. 
 
 
IV. 
Despite its neglect by many West Germans, the “German question” 
continued to lie at the core of politics – meaning politics based on 
potential and interests, to a much lesser degree on morality – in 
Europe. Its key was held in Moscow’s Kremlin. In the final analysis, 
then, German affairs – as well as things in eastern central Europe - 
depended on political strategies developed by the Soviet leadership.  
The decisive changes came with Gorbachev’s access to power, in 
March 1985 - in retrospect, one of history’s fortuities. Gorbachev’s 
career had been promoted by Yuri Andropov, long-term chairman 
of the KGB and head of the party from 1982 until his death, in 1984. 
Andropov had proven himself as an unrelenting hard-liner in 
assisting the Soviets’ suppression of the Hungarian uprising in 1956 
and in crushing the Prague Spring in 1968. During the arms race in 
the early 1980s, i.e. at another stage of the Cold War, he refused to 
seek a compromise with the US, relying on the Western (notably 
West German) peace movement to prevent the Americans from 
countering the Soviet SS 20 missiles with weapons of a similar 
category. Andropov’s miscalculations in power politics came into 
the open when President Ronald Reagan called the bluff, 
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denouncing the Soviet Union as an “evil empire” and challenging it 
by announcing a new Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI). The 
superior system was to be based in space, made functioning by 
sophisticated electronics. SDI, it may be recalled, was to remain a 
concept on paper. It helped the West to win the Cold War. 
The American President, detested by leftist liberals in the US and 
all over Europe, was counting on the inherent weakness of the 
Soviet system. While its state-centralized economy had fallen far 
behind the West in technology and productivity, the USSR was 
spending 70 per cent of its budget on the military, aside from 
pouring billions into its geopolitical efforts in Afghanistan, Cuba, 
Nicaragua, Syria, Libya, South Yemen, North Korea etc. At that 
point, Andropov and the Kremlin leadership came to realize that 
economic modernization was needed to keep up in the global power 
game. One may hypothetically ask which course history might have 
taken with Andropov’s staying longer at the head of the Soviet 
regime. Very likely, he would have followed the Chinese model put 
into practice in 1979 by Deng Xiaoping, who succeeded in achieving 
a modernized economy by preserving a dictatorial system. After 
fifteen months, in February 1984, before he could have successfully 
applied new strategies for the Russian Empire, Andropov died of 
kidney failure. When his successor, Konstantin Chernenko, died 
only one year later, Mikhail Gorbachev ascended to the party’s head 
position of General Secretary.  
Among Gorbachev’s advisers, we find Alexander Yakovlev 
(1923-2005) and Vyacheslav Dashichev (1925-2016). Yakovlev, 
from 1983 to 1990 was head of the Institute of World Economy and 
International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Perhaps 
already somewhat disenchanted by Marxist-Leninist dogmas, he got 
to know the US as a former Fulbright student at Columbia 
University (1958/1959). Serving as Soviet ambassador to Canada in 
the 1970s, he struck up an amicable relationship with liberal Prime 
Minister Pierre Trudeau. Although Yakovlev’s career as a reformer 
seems to be not so clear-cut, he is known for being the architect of 
glasnost and perestroika. Liberalization, then, was to end the 
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authoritarian system within and to alter relations with the East 
European countries. When the Brezhnev doctrine proclaiming 
Soviet hegemony in its Warsaw Pact bloc was revoked, it became 
clear that the Soviet Union was departing from its previous course 
and would no longer intervene in its Eastern European client states. 
Historian Dashichev, himself a war veteran, now head of the 
Foreign Policy Department at the Institute of World Socialist 
Systems at the USSR Academy of Sciences, had come to critically 
assess Stalin’s role in WW II and Soviet Post-War policies. Acting 
as Gorbachev’s adviser on foreign policy, he inspired “new 
thinking” by approaching the German question. The concept of a 
“Common Europe Home” made essential a new design for 
Germany in Europe’s centre. Also, reformers knew that West 
Germany’s economy was needed for salvaging the Soviet Union 
from economic breakdown. In the summer of 1986, the pitiful state 
of Soviet technological standards had been exposed dramatically by 
the melt-down in the nuclear power plant at Chernobyl. 
In October 1986, at their spectacular summit meeting in 
Reykyavik, Gorbachev had come to accords with President Reagan 
to end the arms race. Nonetheless, he was still hesitating to take up 
the German problem. There was no direct response when President 
Reagan, at the peak of his visit to Berlin, June 12, 1987, exclaimed 
“Mr Gorbachev, tear down this wall!” It was only two years later, 
during his visit to West Germany in the summer of 1989, when 
Gorbachev and his wife Raissa were cheered by crowds shouting 
“Gorbi, Gorbi”, that the Russian leader indicated a change of policy. 
At a banquet in Bonn, when Chancellor Kohl broached the theme 
of German unity, Gorbachev responded by speaking of a solution 
in the future, thereby accepting the topic. 
Gorbachev’s iniatives opened political leeway for reform-minded 
Communists as well as for oppositionists in Hungary and Poland. 
In the GDR, Gorbachev’s “new thinking” fostered hopes among 
the long-frustrated people and encouraged the dissidents. On the 
other side, the SED leadership refused to read the signs of the time, 
missing its last chance of restabilising their power by reform. 
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Instead, up to its very end, the regime’s repression was not 
alleviated. What is more, party ideologue and top functionary Kurt 
Hager did not refrain from making offending remarks. Egon Krenz, 
as a member of the Politbureau in charge of affairs of youth and 
education, also well-known for his role in faking local elections in 
May, caused an outrage throughout the country, when he 
commented on the bloody finale of the “Chinese Spring” on 
Peking’s Tiananmen Square (June 4, 1989) as “having restored 
order”. A few weeks later, June 27, Austria’s Foreign Minister Alois 
Mock and his Hungarian colleague Gyula Horn in joint symbolic 
action cut the barbed wire separating their countries. The Iron 
Curtain was being removed. When Hungary proceed to in fact 
opening its border September 10, the mass exodus from the GDR 
to the West set in. 
There is irony in some historical dates. In September 1989, 
President François Mitterrand was about to conclude the two-
hundred-year anniversary of the French Revolution with 
celebrations at Valmy, site of an inconclusive battle on September 
20, 1792, between the revolutionary army and the armies of the old 
feudal German (Holy Roman) Empire. In September 1989, there 
was another revolution going on in Central Europe. Gorbachev had 
been invited to East Berlin to participate in the GDR ‘s 40-year 
anniversary October 7, 1989. When he was standing on the stage 
next to Honecker and close to Jaruzelski to watch the military 
parade, the regime’s celebrations were disturbed by young 
demonstrators shouting “Gorbachev”. The visitor from Moscow 
had come to lecture his hosts: “Life will punish him who is coming 
too late”. When, on October 17, Egon Krenz, Günter Schabowski, 
and hated Stasi chief Erich Mielke staged a coup to save the regime 
by deposing Honecker in the Politbureau, they did come too late.  
For good reasons, protagonists of the peaceful revolution in the 
GDR refer to Leipzig as its focus and to October 9 as its crucial 
date. As to its revolutionary character, it is worth noting that, at a 
nearby NVA (National People’s Army) training school for non-
commissioned officers, soldiers refused to be shipped to the scene 
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in arms. Yet there were other forces preparing for violence. The 
authorities, with lists of leading dissidents, had set up camps to 
arrest protesters as well as emergency wards storing blood bottles at 
hospitals. In that night, for whatever reasons, the security forces 
refrained from stopping the huge march. There is doubt concerning 
Egon Krenz’s recent claims of having himself given orders not to 
shoot. The massive protest in Leipzig (preceded by a similarly 
peaceful protest in Plauen) triggered demonstrations in numerous 
other cities. November 4, about a million people assembled on East 
Berlin’s Alexanderplatz to voice their demands. When Schabowski 
(who, later on, was ready to deplore his own political role and 
ideological delusions) and Markus Wolf, in a sort of gambit just 
recently retired from the top of GDR espionage and now re-
emerging on the political scene, attempted to convince the crowds 
of their good intentions, they were booed down from the stage. The 
latter-day reformers’ last attempt to handle the situation by granting 
free travel failed November 9 at Schabowski’s press conference. In 
that night, the Berlin Wall came down. 
 
 
V. 
The fall of the Wall, in irresistible dynamics as it were, ushered in 
Germany’s reunification. Recognizing the window of opportunity, 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl took the initiative on November 28. 
Having intentionally abstained from consulting with West 
Germany’s allies, he presented a blueprint for achieving Germany’s 
unity in a sequence of steps: close cooperation, confederation, 
unification. The GDR’s new government had no choice but to give 
in to Kohl’s strategy. In vain, the SED leadership tried to save the 
situation by changing the party’s name into PDS (Party of 
Democratic Socialism) and directing the people’s wrath against the 
Stasi, its very own instrument of power and oppression. Returning 
from a visit to Moscow in January 1990, Prime Minister Hans 
Modrow, considered as a reformer, took up the Leipzig rallying cry 
“Deutschland einig Vaterland”. 
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Under pressure from all sides, Modrow’s interim government 
accepted demands to reschedule free elections for the Volkskammer 
to an earlier date, March 18, 1990. On that day, political groups 
representing a number of dissidents favouring a slower pace or even 
advocating to preserve the GDR as a state, were marginalized by an 
alliance led by the CDU. Due above all to SPD chairman Oskar 
Lafontaine who had ostentatiously exhibited his indifference to 
German unity, the vote for the Social Democrats was much smaller 
than expected. Willy Brandt, who had hoped for victory at the polls 
in the former heartlands of Social Democracy, was deeply 
disappointed, feeling personally offended by Lafontaine. 
Nonetheless, Willy Brandt’s name will be recorded in the annals of 
German reunification. He had stood next to Kohl during an 
emotional scene at the Schoeneberg town hall (his former West 
Berlin office seat) staged the day after the dramatic night of 
November 9. Just a few days afterwards, Willy Brandt, the grand old 
man of European democratic socialism, declared that “now that 
which belongs together is growing together” (“Jetzt wächst zusammen, 
was zusammengehört”). Throughout the crucial period from 
November 1989 to October 3, 1990, date of country’s formal 
reunification, Kohl could rely on Brandt’s support, as well as on 
Social Democrats like Helmut Schmidt. 
The new GDR government formed in March was based on a 
coalition of Christian Democrats and Social Democrats. In the 
following months, the East German governments worked in parallel 
and cooperation with the Federal Government. Disputes arose 
about the mode of reunification, some deputies pleading for a joint 
constitutional assembly as stipulated in Article 146 in the West 
German constitution (Grundgesetz). In view of time running out for 
a prolonged process, the Volkskammer on August 23 decided to 
accede to the Federal Republic via Article 23, in its then wording 
open to such interpretation. De facto unity had been achieved July 
1st, the day the West German DM was introduced, the East German 
currency (Mark) was tumbling in value. The negative aspects of this 
politically motivated move of setting an exchange rate of 1:1 became 
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apparent in the early nineties when, in the East, numerous privatized 
firms faced with unforeseen debts proved unable to compete on the 
market. They went into bankruptcy, innumerable people losing their 
jobs. 
On the international scene, the cry for German unity was 
channelled into diplomacy. The German question was not to be left 
to the Germans themselves. In the final analysis, its solution 
depended on the four victorious powers of WW II. We may recall 
that not all of West Germany’s allies were happy about 
consequences arising from the collapse of the Wall. Britain’s 
Conservative Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, while voicing her 
sympathy for the East Germans’ longing for liberty, bluntly declared 
this had nothing to do with the idea of reuniting Germany. This was 
not to happen in her lifetime. In March 1990, when the inevitable 
was taking shape, she convened a meeting with scholars from Great 
Britain and the US, who tried to diffuse her apprehensions. In 
December 1989, Francois Mitterrand had flown to Kyiv to meet and 
persuade Gorbachev to avert German predominance in Europe by 
committing the Soviet Union to the status quo and by maintaining 
support for the new East German government. Overlooking 
Ukrainian flags being waved in Kyiv, Mitterrand failed to recognize 
the situation Gorbachev was caught up in. With Soviet power 
rapidly depleting, the economy in dire straits, and secessionist 
tendencies growing in Georgia, in the Baltic region, in Ukraine, and 
in Belarus, he had little choice but letting German things take their 
course. Aside from Gorbachev’s consent to reunification, during the 
entire process, the Germans could rely on the unambiguous support 
of the United States under President George H.W. Bush. 
Up to the early phase of the Two-Plus-Four negotiations, in May, 
Gorbachev upheld the concept of German neutrality as the key to 
European security. In fact, for a moment, this idea was also voiced 
by West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who 
had become a friend with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard 
Shevardnadze (later on second President of Georgia). A neutral 
Germany would have meant the end of the pact systems, of both 
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NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Helmut Kohl, opposing neutralization 
himself, knew that such a scheme was unacceptable to the 
Americans. For them (as in the eyes of others), it was essential, in 
the words of US Secretary of State Jimmy Baker, to keep “the 
Germans on the leash”. 
In February 1990, Genscher came out proclaiming the formula 
Two-Plus-Four (meaning negotiations between the two German 
states and the Four Powers). Talks began in May. In July, during a 
cordial meeting with Kohl in his Caucasian home region, 
Gorbachev too was ready to accept the concept of leaving united 
Germany in NATO. As a Western concession to the USSR, it was 
agreed in the Two-Plus-Four Treaty signed in Moscow September 
12, 1990, that along with unilateral Soviet withdrawal and limiting 
German armed forces to 370 000, NATO would not station troops 
(other than Germans) on former GDR territory. Nor were nuclear 
weapons to be stationed there. 
Serving as a substitute of a peace treaty, the Treaty on the Final 
Settlement with Respect to Germany was to come into effect October 3, 
2019. On that day, the two post-war German states, separately 
established in 1949, were reunited into one single state. 
 
 
VI. 
There were immediate and long-term consequences of Germany’s 
reunification in the year 1990. On the national level, there was soon 
to be seen in the East a reversal of great expectations into 
disappointment. Integration into the Western capitalist market 
system via privatization went along with incidents of fraud and 
inequity. Many people, faced with unemployment, seeing 
themselves deprived of their hopes, turned their frustration into 
political radicalism. For some thirty years, after repeatedly changing 
its party labels (today “Die Linke”/ The Left) the ex-communist 
PDS, having itself illegally shipped some billions to foreign banks, 
has been profiting from discontent. In this field, “Die Linke” is 
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competing with the AfD (Alternative für Deutschland) on the other side 
of the political spectrum. 
Radical nationalist sentiments shot up soon after reunification, 
manifesting itself in murderous neo-Nazi attacks on foreigners and 
asylum-seekers. Extreme right-wing parties like the NPD appeared 
on the scene. Causes of these phenomena are manifold. Aside from 
nationalist sentiments surviving and existing undiluted by the Party’s 
antifascist proclamations even in the ranks of the SED, the regime’s 
atheism needs to be identified as one seedbed of that unsavoury 
fruit. 
The rise of the rightist AfD in recent years can in part be seen 
against this background. Its success, though, cannot simply be 
interpreted in terms of right-wing extremism. To be sure, the AfD 
– like its counterpart on the left - is carried by populist emotions 
and appeals. To a large degree, these sentiments stem from the East 
Germans' experiences ensuing the country’s unification they had 
yearned for. After jubilance for participating in Western wealth and 
liberties, there came the shock of economic collapse and 
unemployment. 
Many people were forced to find jobs in often far distant places 
in the West. Over the years, up to three million (out of less than 
seventeen million in GDR) left their homes in the East for the West. 
They were there confronted with different mentalities and the 
complexities of an immigrant society. The “remainers” were 
inclined to cultivate resentments against the Western “take-over”, 
apparent in politics, firms, universities – and Western “green” 
ideology. The estrangement of West and East Germans had 
encompassed two, perhaps three generations, living in two different 
societies. In the West, younger generations had been raised with 
their eyes to Western Europe and a lack of national sentiments. 
Detaching themselves from the idea of the nation-state and of 
German reunification, intellectuals proclaimed the concept of a 
post-national democracy. When the Wall fell, after a short phase of 
joyful national unity, the Western post-national sentiments, quite 
often arising from real – or imagined - shame about their nation’s 
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history again began to prevail. In a sort of educational project, these 
sentiments were imported in the East. Many West Germans 
displayed little regard for living conditions in the East by 
condescendingly speaking of their compatriots as “the Ossis” (the 
guys from the East). 
As to the AfD strongholds in the Eastern Bundesländer (Federal 
states), the very fact that it is gathering votes from all corners calls 
for differentiated explanation. First, party affiliation in the eastern 
regions is weak, except in a specific Catholic section in Thuringia 
and among the minority of Protestant church-goers in an atheist 
society. In fact, for many years many AfD members and voters used 
to be conservative adherents of the CDU. Secondly, people in the 
East preserved traditions of local and national consciousness rooted 
in history, rejecting the Western concept of multiculturalism in a 
multi-ethnic society. Third, due to their experience with an 
authoritarian dictatorship, they are sensitive vis-a-vis pressures from 
above, even in their milder democratic forms of telling people what 
to think and feel (to wit: this is not meant as an excuse for primitive 
sentiments and behaviour). Last but not least, the AfD’s ascent is to 
be ascribed to German policies in the era of Chancellor Angela 
Merkel, herself a remarkable example of an Eastern conformist’s 
political success in the West. 
After bringing about the downfall of Kohl, her long-time 
promoter, as CDU chairman in 1999, Merkel for some years 
presented herself as a vociferous opponent of multiculturalism. 
When she reversed her stance on immigration policies – vacillating 
from opening the gates in 2015 and trying to close them in costly 
deals with Turkey’s President Erdogan –, she met with opposition 
throughout Germany (and elsewhere). Not only in the Eastern part 
of Germany voters switched their political loyalties to the right. 
Today we even find AfD sympathizers among some former GDR 
oppositionists (known as Bürgerrechtler), disenchanted with the 
Greens, the SPD, and the CDU under the leadership of Merkel. 
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VII. 
Germany’s reunification in 1990 upset the entire political scenery of 
Europe. One of its first consequences - even though not its primary 
and only cause - was the collapse of the Soviet Union, according to 
Vladimir Putin “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 
twentieth century”. In Moscow, Gorbachev’s political leniency 
towards war-time enemy Germany, including the abandonment of 
the Soviet glacis in Eastern Europe by withdrawing all troops, 
provoked opposition, culminating in plans to oust him by a military 
coup. When the conspiracy failed, with soldiers dismounting from 
their tanks in the streets of Moscow, August 19-21, 1991, the Soviet 
Union, heir to the Czarist Russian Empire, fell apart. The three 
Baltic states, which had declared their sovereignty the year before, 
now formally proclaimed their independence. Five months before, 
in April 1991, Georgia had declared its independence. Yet Georgia, 
regarded by many Russians as their crown jewel in the Caucasus, 
soon entered into civil strife. The Soviet Union, disrupted by ancient 
antagonisms dating back to the nineteenth century, was formally 
dissolved in the Declaration of Alma Ata, December 21, 1991. 
Instead of national revival hoped for by many patriots, Russia 
under President Boris Yeltsin, a hero of the failed putsch, sank into 
agony. The Yeltsin era was marked by a total collapse of the 
economy. Radical liberal market doctrines were applied by former 
Communists, the “big bang” causing poverty, despair, coinciding 
with corruption and crime at an unprecedented scale. It was only 
under the authoritarian rule of Putin, basing his power on his KGB 
apparatus and on an economy of state-controlled monopolies 
exporting Russian minerals, that, at the expense of civil liberties, the 
country was recovering from the economic disaster.  
Russia, by its name of Russian Federation (Rossiskaya Federatsiya), 
continued to be a multi-ethnic empire. When, on November 1, 
1991, air force general Dshokhar Dudayev proclaimed 
independence for the small Caucasus region of Chechenya, this 
declaration was not recognized by Gorbachev. Three years later, 
Yeltsin decided to intervene against the rebellious and war-like 
Herbert Ammon - The Fall of the Berlin Wall 
38 
secessionists. The Chechen war – soon in its second round initiating 
Putin’s ascent to power - culminated in bloody horrors and entailing 
the entry of terrorist Islamism into the Caucasian theatre. 
If in some of these developments there seems to be a cogent 
causality with the fall of the Wall, the pattern of conflict leading back 
to it does become apparent in various other cases. It is open to 
dispute if the ethnic disintegration of Yugoslavia ushering in the 
Balkan wars in the nineties can be seen as a direct and inevitable 
consequence of Germany’s reunification. Another case in point is 
Ukraine. When the protracted low-key war between Russia and 
Ukraine in the latter’s separatist regions near the Crimea (re-annexed 
by Russia in 2014) erupted in 2013, it was preceded by a power 
struggle in Kyiv, intermeshed with nationalist emotions and cries for 
democracy. At its core lay Russian efforts to bloc “Western” 
influence and Ukrainian tendencies of joining both the European 
Union and NATO. 
In the 1990s, under the weak leadership of Yeltsin, Russia had 
seen NATO’s expansion to Eastern Europe. Yeltsin’s successor, 
Putin, while promoting Russia’s resurgence as a world power (based 
once more on military strength), rejected the West’s argument of 
providing security for the Baltic states and Poland. At the Munich 
Security Conference in 2007, he openly challenged the West by 
accusing it of having violated the accords on military disengagement 
agreed upon in the Two-Plus-Four talks. As against this 
background, it is worth recalling that Gorbachev too, whilst 
conceding that there exists no written text to confirm Putin’s claim, 
is maintaing the idea of a mutual understanding during these talks 
on the issue of NATO’s future role in Europe. Horst Teltschik, 
Kohl’s leading adviser and negotiator with the Soviets, brings back 
to mind that the Two-Plus-Four Treaty was concluded with the 
Soviet Union still existing as a political entity, thereby inferring that 
NATO’s expansion had not been in anybody’s view at that time. 
In the past years, Gorbachev, while deploring the state of 
international affairs, has repeatedly come out in support for Putin 
and defending Russia’s position in the world. To be sure, Putin’s 
Brolly. Journal of Social Sciences 2 (3) 2019 
39 
neo-imperial ambitions and his violent methods cannot be 
overlooked. Nonetheless, whatever the merit of hypothetical 
dispute, it may be argued that a system of collective security in 
Europe in the wake of Two-Plus-Four might have served peace 
better in Europe and elsewhere. Instead, we see the reemergence of 
East-West tensions resembling the Cold War. We observe 
traditional power politics in Eastern Europe and in some same 
regions of the globe like Syria and Venezuela, accompanied by 
another arms race. 
 
 
VIII. 
The most striking consequence of German reunification, signifying 
Germany's reestablishment as Europe’s central power, was the 
creation of the European Union, inaugurated by the Treaty of 
Maastricht in 1992. As mentioned above, in the turbulent weeks of 
November and December 1989, Mitterrand had exerted pressure on 
Kohl to slow down the train toward unity. Kohl gained Mitterrand’s 
consent to the course of German events during a meeting in 
Bordeaux, assuring the French president of his (Kohl’s) 
commitment to the concept of European integration. He was ready 
to sacrifice (West) Germany’s most powerful political instrument, 
i.e. the sovereignty of the Bundesbank (Federal Bank) (labelled as 
“Germany’s nuclear bomb” by Mitterrand’s adviser Jacques Attali) 
as well the DM as Europe’s key currency. Born and raised in 
Rhineland-Palatinate, bearing painful childhood memories of the 
war, Helmut Kohl was devoted to the idea of a peacefully united 
Europe, considering it as an essential part of his German patriotism. 
Indeed, suspicions about his sincerity (as expressed by Margaret 
Thatcher) were unfounded. Meantime, somewhat different charges 
of hegemony are being voiced with regard to Germany’s export-
oriented economy profiting from a “weak” Euro. 
European integration was promoted by a series of treaties 
ensuing Maastricht. After failing to create and proclaim a European 
constitution resembling the historical model of the United States, as 
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a sort of substitute the Treaty of Lisbon was signed in 2007. The 
concept of “an ever-closer union” is based on two motives: The first 
is a moral one: devotion to peace in Europe, arising from the 
horrors of war in the twentieth century. The second is its political 
raison d’ être: to prevent future antagonisms among Europeans a) by 
integrating Germany’s power potential into joint structures, thereby 
neutralizing Germany’s predominance feared by its neighbours and 
no longer coveted by the Germans themselves b) by basing 
Europe’s future on a durable, inseparable alliance of France and 
Germany.  
 The process of an integrated Europe dates back to the 1950s, 
starting with the Treaties of Rome,1957. In the wake of EU 
integration marked by Maastricht, Europe’s nation-states have 
progressively ceded political sovereignty to a political system sui 
generis, an in-between of a confederation and federal states. The 
relationship between (limited) national sovereignty and the EU 
superstructure in many aspects seems to escape clear definition. An 
ever-growing bureaucracy in Brussels appears to function as a de facto 
central government. On the continent so far, aversion to “Brussels” 
and criticism of the loss of sovereignty is voiced only by elements 
labelled “populists” and in countries like Hungary under Prime 
Minister Viktor Orbán. 
The concept of unifying Europe into an “ever closer union” 
promoted on the Continent never caught on in England. The Brexit 
movement is rooted in historical sentiments, a “populist” feeling of 
losing democratic sovereignty, last but not least in reservations 
about Germany’s role in Europe. Unfounded though such 
suspicions may be, they gained momentum in view of Chancellor 
Merkel’s fateful decision to open borders to refugees in 2015. Her 
action most likely tipped the scale in perceptions and emotions in 
Britain. Brexit, then, which has become a historical fact thanks to 
Boris Johnson’s landslide victory December 12, 2019, can be seen 
as a remote repercussion of Germany’s reunification in 1990. 
Germany, like other West European countries, due to a growing 
immigrant population of non-European background as well as due 
Brolly. Journal of Social Sciences 2 (3) 2019 
41 
to its immigrant policies, is faced with an unprecedented change of 
its social, political, and cultural foundations. Against the background 
of Orbán’s accusations levelled at Western secularism, on the one 
hand, Islamist tendencies on the other, Europe as a whole is called 
upon to reflect on its cultural moorings. In a specific manner, this 
task needs to be taken up by Germany. In many ways, present-day 
Germany, with its religious traditions among ethnic Germans 
eroding, is marked by its culture of historical guilt (not likely to be 
shared by generations of immigrants). Traditions rooted in religion 
are dissipating. In the country’s memorial culture, the 
commemoration of Nazi barbarism is overshadowing the jubilant 
scenes of the fall of the Wall, November 9, 1989. 
On the political level, Germany remains to be confronted with 
defining its role as the most powerful country in the centre of 
Europe. Suspicions as to exerting hegemony by itself or in close 
coalition with France may be unfounded. Nonetheless, German 
relations with Russia are warily eyed by its eastern neighbours. In 
the wake of the “refugee crisis” of 2015, charges were raised by 
some critics, that Germany was assuming a stance of moral 
hegemony in Europe. After Brexit, the question of mitigating 
centralized power in Brussels or further tightening the European 
Union will be brought up again. We may conclude, then, that thirty 
years after the fall of the Wall, questions concerning Germany’s 
future role in Europe remain to exist. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
